In a partially published opinion filed on October 31, 2025, and certified for partial publication on November 26, 2025, the California Court of Appeal affirmed a workplace violence restraining order obtained by the County of Los Angeles against a former employee, Neill Francis Niblett. The decision in County of Los Angeles v. Niblett (Second Appellate District, Division One, Case No. B327744) addresses the evidentiary standard for establishing a “credible threat of violence” under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8 and clarifies how courts evaluate threatening statements in the context of workplace history and surrounding circumstances.
Niblett was employed as a senior mechanic with the Los Angeles County Fire Department. The County sought a workplace violence restraining order after a series of confrontational workplace incidents involving Niblett and his supervisor, an assistant fire chief identified in the opinion as “Samuel.” The incidents included repeated episodes of raised voices and profanity. The event that prompted the restraining order occurred when Niblett made a statement to a department secretary referencing a prior fatal workplace shooting involving a firefighter. According to the trial court’s findings, Niblett stated words to the effect of: “Do you remember the firefighter who shot and killed another firefighter? That could happen again.” The shooting had occurred approximately one year earlier and was well known within the department.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Niblett’s statement constituted a credible threat of violence within the meaning of section 527.8 and issued a three-year restraining order prohibiting harassment, workplace contact, and firearm possession. Niblett appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of a credible threat and that the restraining order violated his constitutional rights.
Applying the substantial-evidence standard of review, the Court of Appeal affirmed. The court explained that a credible threat of violence under section 527.8 does not require an express or explicit promise to commit an act of violence. Rather, the inquiry is whether the statement or conduct, viewed in context, would cause a reasonable person to fear for their safety. The court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that “the trial court reasonably concluded that Niblett’s statement, viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances, conveyed a serious expression of intent to commit an act of violence at the workplace.” In reaching that conclusion, the court emphasized the significance of Niblett’s reference to a real and recent act of workplace violence within the same department, coupled with his prior confrontational behavior toward his supervisor.
The Court of Appeal also rejected Niblett’s constitutional challenges. The court held that true threats are not protected by the First Amendment and that the trial court’s factual findings supported the conclusion that the statement fell outside constitutional protection. The court further concluded that the firearm restriction imposed by the restraining order did not violate the Second Amendment, noting that such restrictions are expressly authorized by statute in the workplace violence context and are grounded in public safety considerations.
Beyond the specific facts of the case, the opinion illustrates how courts distinguish between ordinary workplace conflict and conduct that justifies injunctive relief under section 527.8. The decision makes clear that employers and courts are not limited to responding only to explicit threats or physical acts. Statements that invoke real-world violence, particularly when made in a charged workplace environment and following prior confrontations, may reasonably be interpreted as conveying a serious risk of harm. The court’s analysis underscores that the statutory framework permits intervention before violence occurs, where the totality of the circumstances supports a finding that workplace safety is at risk.
The Niblett decision therefore provides useful guidance on the application of California’s workplace violence restraining order statute, particularly in safety-sensitive public employment settings. It reinforces that context matters, that references to actual acts of violence may carry substantial evidentiary weight, and that trial courts are afforded discretion to act proactively to protect employees when credible threats are established by clear and convincing evidence.
On appeal, Niblett argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of a credible threat of violence and that the restraining order violated his First and Second Amendment rights. Applying the deferential substantial-evidence standard, the Court of Appeal rejected those arguments. The court explained that a credible threat under section 527.8 need not be an express threat of immediate harm. Rather, the inquiry focuses on whether a reasonable person would interpret the conduct or statements, in context, as a serious expression of intent to commit violence at the workplace. Given the recent history of workplace violence within the department, Niblett’s proximity to his supervisor during prior confrontations, and his explicit reference to the prior shooting, the court concluded the trial court could rationally find a credible threat.
The appellate court also rejected Niblett’s constitutional claims. It held that the restraining order did not violate the First Amendment because true threats are not protected speech and that the trial court’s factual findings supported the conclusion that Niblett’s statements fell outside constitutional protection. The court further concluded that the firearm restriction imposed by the WVRO did not violate the Second Amendment, noting that such restrictions are expressly authorized by statute in the context of workplace violence prevention and are supported by public-safety considerations.
Beyond the merits of the restraining order, the opinion devotes a published section to the conduct of Niblett’s appellate counsel. The Court of Appeal found that counsel had misused artificial intelligence in preparing the opening brief by citing at least one nonexistent case and misstating the holdings of several others, including key authorities relied upon in the argument. The court emphasized that attorneys have an affirmative duty to verify the accuracy of cited authority and that failure to do so undermines the integrity of the appellate process. As a result, the court issued a separate order requiring counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed.
The Niblett decision offers several lessons for public-sector employers and practitioners. It reaffirms that employers may seek WVROs to protect employees from credible threats of workplace violence even where the threatening conduct does not include an explicit statement of intent to harm. The case also underscores the importance of contextual evidence, including prior incidents and workplace history, in evaluating whether conduct rises to the level of a credible threat. Finally, the opinion serves as a cautionary reminder that appellate advocacy requires careful verification of legal authority, regardless of whether research tools rely on traditional databases or emerging technologies.