When “Core Values” Collide with Civil Rights: What Chehade v. Foley & Lardner Means for Employers
This week, a federal district court in Chicago issued a significant decision at the intersection of employment law, free speech, and workplace discrimination. In Chehade v. Foley & Lardner LLP, the court denied a large law firm’s motion for summary judgment after the firm rescinded a job offer to an incoming associate based on her public statements about the Israel–Palestine conflict. The opinion underscores how easily disputes over “values” and social media conduct can morph into triable claims of discrimination when protected characteristics such as religion and ethnicity are part of the context.
Key Facts and Procedural Posture
The plaintiff, Jinan Chehade, is a Muslim woman of Arab descent who had successfully completed a summer associate program with Foley & Lardner and accepted a full‑time associate offer scheduled to begin in October 2023. After the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks in Israel, Chehade made public social media posts and a statement before the Chicago City Council expressing strong pro‑Palestinian views and criticizing what she characterized as decades of occupation. She did not deny making those statements, but consistently maintained that she did not condone attacks on civilians and did not support terrorism.
Shortly before her start date, firm leadership became aware of Chehade’s statements and began an internal review. While some firm leaders favored allowing her to start work and addressing any concerns through conversation, others interpreted her remarks as endorsing or justifying violence. The firm ultimately rescinded her offer the day before she was scheduled to begin employment, explaining internally that her statements were “misaligned with [the firm’s] core values.”
Chehade sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Illinois Human Rights Act, alleging that her religion and Arab ethnicity were motivating factors in the decision to revoke her offer. Foley moved for summary judgment, arguing that the decision was based solely on Chehade’s speech and judgment, not her protected characteristics.
How the Court Analyzed the Discrimination Claims
Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman rejected that argument at the summary judgment stage. Applying Seventh Circuit precedent, the court emphasized that discrimination cases are not limited to rigid frameworks and may be evaluated holistically. The key question was whether a reasonable jury could conclude that Chehade’s protected characteristics were a motivating factor in the adverse employment action.
Several aspects of the record, when viewed together, were enough to create genuine disputes of material fact. The court noted the absence of clear, objective standards defining the firm’s “core values” or how social media speech would be evaluated. Evidence showed that other Foley attorneys, who were not Muslim or Arab, made highly inflammatory social media posts calling for extreme measures against Palestinians after October 7, yet were not disciplined and were merely allowed or asked to remove their posts.
The court also focused on disparate treatment. Another associate who posted pro‑Palestinian content was counseled about the firm’s social media policy rather than disciplined. Additionally, questions posed to Chehade during the firm’s final meeting with her extended beyond her statements and into her background and family, including her father’s work at a mosque. A jury, the court explained, could reasonably view that line of questioning as reflecting reliance on stereotypes tied to religion or ethnicity.
Pretext was another central issue. Foley asserted that it rescinded the offer because Chehade showed poor judgment and condoned violence. Yet contemporaneous notes reflected that Chehade expressly stated she did not condone terrorism and condemned Hamas. Whether firm leaders genuinely believed otherwise, or whether that explanation masked discriminatory assumptions, is a credibility determination that must be made by a jury rather than resolved on summary judgment.
Finally, the court considered evidence that Arab American associates at the firm felt fearful and unsafe after Chehade’s offer was rescinded. Such evidence, while not dispositive on its own, could support an inference that stereotypes and hostility toward a protected group influenced decision‑making.
The court was careful to note what it was not deciding. The ruling does not establish that Foley violated the law, nor does it hold that employers are prohibited from taking action based on employees’ public speech. Instead, the decision reflects the limited role of the court at the summary judgment stage. The court’s task was not to determine who was right or wrong, but to decide whether the evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to Chehade, created genuine disputes of material fact that must be resolved by a jury.
Why This Case Matters in California
Although Chehade arose under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Illinois Human Rights Act, the decision in instructive for California employers. Title VII applies fully in California and prohibits employment discrimination based on religion, race, and national origin. In addition, California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) provides parallel—and in some respects broader—protections against discrimination and retaliation based on religion, religious creed, ancestry, and national origin.
California courts routinely look to federal Title VII cases as either precedent or persuasive authority, as appropriate, when interpreting FEHA, particularly on issues such as discriminatory motive, pretext, and disparate treatment. Like Title VII, FEHA does not require a protected characteristic to be the sole reason for an adverse employment action. It is enough if the protected characteristic was a motivating factor. This mirrors the analytical framework discussed by the court in Chehade and reinforces why summary judgment is often inappropriate where intent and credibility are disputed.
The same risk factors identified in Chehade would resonate strongly in a California courtroom. Vague or inconsistently enforced “core values,” uneven application of social media policies, differential treatment of employees expressing opposing political views, and questioning that drifts into an employee’s religious background or ethnicity all raise red flags under FEHA. California juries are routinely asked to assess whether employer explanations are genuine or pretextual, and FEHA’s employee‑protective standards make those cases particularly difficult to resolve before trial.
For California employers, the lesson is not that social media speech is untouchable. Employers may still enforce neutral, well‑defined policies and address conduct that genuinely interferes with business operations or violates legitimate standards. But Chehade illustrates how quickly a judgment‑based decision, especially in a politically charged moment, can become legally vulnerable when protected characteristics are intertwined with the employer’s reasoning.
For California employees and applicants, the case reinforces an equally important point: adverse actions framed as concerns about “judgment,” “values,” or “fit” remain subject to scrutiny when there is evidence of disparate treatment or reliance on stereotypes tied to religion or ethnicity. Under both Title VII and FEHA, those disputes are typically resolved by juries, not judges at summary judgment. The ruling does not mean Foley violated the law, nor does it establish that employers may never discipline or decline to hire employees based on public speech. Instead, it reflects a core principle of employment discrimination law: when protected characteristics are intertwined with an employer’s assessment of conduct, and when similarly situated individuals are treated differently, the case often proceeds before a jury.
Practical Takeaways for Employers
For employers, the takeaway is practical and sobering. Vague references to “values,” inconsistent enforcement of social media policies, and ad hoc decision‑making in politically charged moments create legal risk. Clear standards, even‑handed application, and careful separation of protected characteristics from conduct‑based decisions are essential.
For employees and applicants, the case illustrates that adverse actions framed as judgment calls or cultural fit can still be challenged when there is evidence that religion, ethnicity, or other protected traits played a role. At the summary judgment stage, courts do not decide who is right; they decide whether a jury must. In Chehade’s case, the answer was yes, and this case is headed for a jury trial.