Professor’s Parody Syllabus Statement Was Protected Speech, Ninth Circuit Holds
Public employers often have broad authority to manage the workplace, respond to complaints, and enforce nondiscrimination policies. Public universities, however, operate in a setting where the First Amendment carries special force. A recent Ninth Circuit decision illustrates the tension between those principles when a professor’s controversial speech causes student outrage and institutional disruption.
In Reges v. Cauce, the Ninth Circuit held the University of Washington violated a professor’s First Amendment rights when it investigated, reprimanded, and threatened discipline over a parody statement he placed in a course syllabus. The case arose from a dispute over an Indigenous land acknowledgment, but the court’s decision is broader than that. It addresses how far a public university may go when a faculty member uses course materials to express a controversial viewpoint on an issue of public concern.
The Syllabus Statement That Started the Dispute
Stuart Reges was a teaching professor at the University of Washington’s Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science and Engineering. The University had adopted an official land acknowledgment recognizing the Coast Salish peoples and the Suquamish, Tulalip, and Muckleshoot nations. The Allen School later recommended, as part of its inclusive teaching practices, that instructors consider including an Indigenous land acknowledgment in their syllabi.
Reges disagreed with the University’s land acknowledgment and with the recommendation to include one in syllabi. He viewed the practice as a political statement connected to diversity, equity, and inclusion. In January 2022, he included his own parody version in the syllabus for an introductory computer science course with roughly 500 students.
The statement read: “I acknowledge that by the labor theory of property the Coast Salish people can claim historical ownership of almost none of the land currently occupied by the University of Washington.”
The reaction was swift. Students complained. Some said they felt unwelcome or unsafe. A screenshot circulated online. The Allen School’s leadership asked Reges to remove the statement. When he refused, the school had staff replace the online syllabus with a version omitting it. School officials also publicly condemned the statement and encouraged students to file complaints.
The University later opened a disciplinary process. A faculty committee found the statement had caused significant disruption, including harm to Native students’ morale and learning. Although the University did not ultimately impose formal sanctions, it reprimanded Reges, withheld a merit pay increase during the investigation, and warned him future use of the statement in syllabi could lead to discipline.
The Lawsuit and the District Court’s Ruling
Reges sued University officials under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. He alleged First Amendment retaliation and viewpoint discrimination. He also challenged the University’s nondiscrimination policy, known as Executive Order 31, as facially overbroad and vague.
The district court agreed Reges had spoken on a matter of public concern, but it ruled for the University. Applying the familiar Pickering balancing test for public employee speech, the district court concluded the University’s interest in addressing disruption outweighed Reges’s speech interest.
The district court also dismissed Reges’s facial challenge to the University’s policy. The policy allowed discipline or corrective action for conduct deemed “unacceptable or inappropriate,” even if the conduct did not rise to unlawful discrimination, harassment, or retaliation. The district court narrowed the policy by interpreting it to cover only conduct resembling discrimination, harassment, or retaliation.
The Ninth Circuit Reversed
The Ninth Circuit reversed. Judge Bress, writing for the majority, began with the premise that public universities occupy a distinctive role under the First Amendment. The court emphasized academic freedom, debate, disagreement, and exposure to controversial ideas as core features of higher education.
The University argued the syllabus statement was government speech because syllabi are required course documents and because professors distribute them as part of their official duties. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument.
The court relied heavily on its earlier decision in Demers v. Austin, which held Garcetti v. Ceballos does not apply in the same way to speech related to scholarship or teaching by public university professors. In ordinary public employment cases, speech made pursuant to official job duties may be treated as employer-controlled speech. But academic speech receives different treatment because teaching and scholarship sit at the center of university work and First Amendment protection.
The court held Reges’s parody statement related to teaching because it responded to the Allen School’s own recommendation about what instructors should place in syllabi. The University had recommended land acknowledgments as part of inclusive teaching practices. Reges used the syllabus to challenge that recommendation and the ideas behind it. For the majority, that placed the statement within protected academic speech, not government speech.
Why the Court Found Retaliation
The Ninth Circuit had little trouble finding adverse employment action. The University opened a lengthy disciplinary investigation, withheld a merit pay increase during the process, reprimanded Reges, and warned him future similar conduct could lead to discipline. The court held those actions were reasonably likely to deter protected speech.
The University also did not seriously dispute causation. The investigation, reprimand, and warning were based on the syllabus statement. The decisive question was whether the University’s asserted interest in preventing disruption outweighed Reges’s First Amendment interest.
The majority held it did not.
The court acknowledged the statement offended students and caused controversy. But in the majority’s view, student anger, discomfort, or outrage over a professor’s viewpoint cannot by itself justify discipline in a public university setting. The court reasoned that universities are supposed to be places where students encounter contested ideas. If adverse student reaction were enough, unpopular views could be suppressed through what the court described as a form of heckler’s veto.
The University argued there was more than ordinary discomfort. It pointed to students transferring out of Reges’s class, concerns about Native student recruitment, and reports that Native students had taken leave or dropped out. The Ninth Circuit found the record insufficient. One student who took leave was not in Reges’s class and had cited other reasons. The record did not substantiate the second reported student who allegedly dropped out. The court also found the evidence speculative on whether the statement impaired Native student recruitment or caused students to switch sections.
Because the University failed to prove sufficient disruption under Pickering, the Ninth Circuit directed entry of summary judgment for Reges on his First Amendment retaliation claim.
The court also held Reges was entitled to summary judgment on his viewpoint discrimination claim. The University acted because of the view he expressed in the mock land acknowledgment. That, the court held, was viewpoint discrimination.
The Policy Challenge Was Also Revived
The Ninth Circuit also revived Reges’s facial challenge to the University’s nondiscrimination policy.
The policy stated the University could discipline or take corrective action for “any conduct that is deemed unacceptable or inappropriate,” regardless of whether the conduct rose to unlawful discrimination, harassment, or retaliation. The district court tried to save the policy by reading that language narrowly. But the Ninth Circuit held the text was too broad to support that limiting construction at the pleading stage.
The majority did not finally decide whether the policy was unconstitutional. Instead, it remanded for the district court to consider the challenge in the first instance, including how the policy has been enforced and applied in practice.
The Dissent Saw the Case Differently
Judge Sidney Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed Pickering applied, but he disagreed with the majority’s balancing.
In his view, the University had weighty interests in educating and enrolling Native students. He emphasized the University’s responsibilities to Native students, its relationships with regional tribes, and evidence student learning was disrupted. The dissent also gave weight to the fact the statement appeared in a required introductory computer science course, where the subject of land acknowledgments was not part of the course content.
Judge Thomas would have held the University’s interest in preventing disruption to Native students’ learning outweighed Reges’s interest in placing the statement in that specific syllabus. He also would have upheld the district court’s narrowing interpretation of the University’s policy.
What This Means for Public Employers and Universities
The decision is especially important for public universities, but it also offers a broader reminder for public employers. When employee speech touches on a matter of public concern, discipline can raise First Amendment issues. The employer’s burden becomes heavier when the speech occurs in a university setting and relates to teaching, scholarship, or academic debate.
The case does not mean public universities are powerless to respond to offensive or controversial faculty speech. Administrators, students, and colleagues may criticize, condemn, and debate the speech. Universities may also enforce properly tailored policies. But the Ninth Circuit drew a constitutional line between institutional disagreement and employment retaliation.
For public universities, the case also highlights the importance of policy drafting. Broad language allowing discipline for speech or conduct deemed “unacceptable” or “inappropriate” may invite constitutional challenge if the policy is not tied to clear standards.
For private employers, the First Amendment analysis generally will not apply in the same way because private employers are not state actors. But the practical lesson remains useful. When an employee’s controversial expression triggers complaints, the employer should separate the viewpoint from any independently policy-violating conduct, document actual operational impacts, and avoid relying on generalized offense or discomfort as the basis for discipline.
Our previous post on the Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision in this case can be found here.
Case Summary
Reges v. Cauce was filed as an amended opinion on May 14, 2026, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Case No. 24-3518. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment for University of Washington officials, directed entry of summary judgment for Professor Stuart Reges on his First Amendment retaliation and viewpoint discrimination claims, and remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of the appropriate relief and renewed review of his facial challenge to the University’s nondiscrimination policy.