Ninth Circuit Revives Human Trafficking Claims Against Seafood Importer After Congress Clarifies Civil Liability
When workers allege they were trapped in forced labor overseas, can a United States company face civil liability if it tried, but failed, to profit from the products made under those conditions?
The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Ratha v. Rubicon Resources, LLC answers yes, at least under the court’s interpretation of Congress’s 2022 amendment to the federal civil human trafficking remedy. The decision gives new force to civil claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a), the federal statute allowing trafficking victims to sue not only direct perpetrators, but also those who knowingly benefit from participation in a venture connected to trafficking.
The case involved Cambodian workers who alleged they were recruited from rural villages, sent to work in seafood factories in Thailand, and subjected to forced labor, passport confiscation, debt, threats, retaliation, and harsh working conditions. They sued Rubicon Resources, LLC, a United States company, alleging Rubicon marketed seafood products from those factories in the United States and participated in a venture benefiting from human trafficking.
The district court granted summary judgment for Rubicon. A Ninth Circuit panel initially affirmed. But after Congress amended the statute, the en banc Ninth Circuit reversed and sent the case back for further proceedings.
The Alleged Forced Labor Behind Imported Seafood
According to the opinion, Phatthana Seafood Co., Ltd. operated a seafood processing factory in southern Thailand. Rubicon was a United States company formed so Phatthana and other seafood producers could sell goods more easily in the United States. Rubicon did not own the factories or hire the workers, but its employees coordinated sales and marketing, visited and conducted pre-audits of Phatthana’s factories, and arranged import and shipping of Phatthana’s products. Rubicon’s marketing materials also claimed the company controlled “every aspect of production.”
The plaintiffs were Cambodian villagers recruited to work at seafood factories, including Phatthana’s. They alleged they were promised competitive pay and free housing, but instead were paid less than promised, charged for accommodations and other expenses, and subjected to coercive conditions. Their passports allegedly were confiscated when they arrived. The workers claimed they could not leave because they were told police would arrest them without their passports, which would not be returned until recruitment fees and other amounts were paid.
The opinion described additional allegations of threats and retaliation. Workers who complained allegedly faced harsh punishment. Some workers who tried to leave were arrested.
The conditions did not go unnoticed. In October 2011, Rubicon tried to sell 14 containers of shrimp to Walmart, which rejected the shipment because of concerns about working conditions at the factory. In January 2012, plaintiff Keo Ratha spoke to the Phnom Penh Post, saying he was subjected to forced labor and hundreds of Cambodian workers wanted to leave but could not get their passports back. By February 2012, Rubicon was aware of that article. More articles followed, and Rubicon managers circulated them internally. Rubicon briefly paused its efforts to sell shrimp to Walmart, then resumed those efforts in July 2012. The Ninth Circuit noted Rubicon ultimately did not sell Phatthana’s shrimp in the United States during the relevant period.
The Procedural History: A Case Revived After Congress Acted
The plaintiffs filed suit in 2016 under the civil remedy provision of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, alleging violations of several federal human trafficking statutes. As to Rubicon, the plaintiffs alleged the company knowingly benefited from participating in a venture it knew or should have known was engaged in peonage, forced labor, involuntary servitude, document abuse, and human trafficking.
The district court granted summary judgment to Rubicon in 2017. It concluded the plaintiffs had not shown Rubicon knowingly participated in a human trafficking venture, had not shown Rubicon knew or should have known human trafficking existed at the factory, and had not shown Rubicon actually benefited from the alleged trafficking.
A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed in Ratha I. The panel held the plaintiffs had not shown Rubicon received a benefit and that the pre-amendment version of section 1595(a) did not allow civil liability for attempts to benefit.
Congress then acted quickly. Fifteen days after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Ratha I, Senators Martin Heinrich, John Cornyn, and Amy Klobuchar proposed an amendment to the Abolish Trafficking Reauthorization Act of 2022. The amendment added the words “or attempts or conspires to benefit” after “whoever knowingly benefits” in section 1595(a). The Senate passed the amended bill the same day, and the President signed it into law on January 5, 2023.
The plaintiffs then returned to the district court and filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), asking for relief from the judgment. They argued Congress’s amendment clarified what section 1595(a) had always meant and therefore applied retroactively. The district court disagreed, holding the amendment was not retroactive. A divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed, but the court later reheard the case en banc.
The Ninth Circuit’s Retroactivity Analysis
The en banc majority held the 2022 amendment applies retroactively.
The court applied the Supreme Court’s retroactivity framework from Landgraf v. USI Film Products. Under that framework, courts first ask whether Congress included an express retroactive effective date. If not, courts ask whether applying the statute would have retroactive effect. If it would, the presumption against retroactivity applies. The final question is whether Congress nevertheless clearly intended the statute to apply retroactively.
The Ninth Circuit first clarified an important doctrinal point. Some earlier Ninth Circuit cases had suggested “clarifying” amendments fall outside the Landgraf framework. The en banc court rejected that approach. Clarifying amendments still must be analyzed under Landgraf. But the fact Congress labeled an amendment “clarifying” can remain evidence of congressional intent.
The ATRA did not contain an express retroactive effective date. The amendment also would have retroactive effect because it increased potential civil liability for past conduct. That meant the presumption against retroactivity applied.
The majority nevertheless found the presumption overcome. It relied on four factors: Congress labeled the amendment “technical and clarifying”; the prior version of section 1595(a) was ambiguous; the earlier Ninth Circuit panel decision created a split with other circuits; and Congress acted swiftly, with immediate effect, after the Ninth Circuit’s prior decision.
The majority emphasized no single factor controlled. Taken together, the court concluded they showed Congress intended the amendment to clarify the statute’s original meaning and apply retroactively.
Attempted Benefit Can Be Enough
The most practical point for businesses is the court’s treatment of “attempt” liability.
Before the amendment, the district court and the earlier Ninth Circuit panel focused on the fact Rubicon had not actually sold Phatthana’s shrimp in the United States during the relevant period. In other words, Rubicon may have tried to benefit from the alleged forced labor, but did not successfully obtain a benefit from those sales.
After the 2022 amendment, the civil statute expressly reaches those who “attempt” to benefit from participation in a trafficking venture. The en banc court held that clarification applied to the plaintiffs’ case. As a result, the absence of a completed sale did not end the case.
That holding has significance beyond the seafood industry. It means companies facing civil trafficking claims may not be able to avoid liability merely by arguing a contemplated transaction failed, a shipment was rejected, or a sale did not close. If the other statutory elements are met, an attempt to benefit may be enough.
Participation Does Not Require Operating the Venture
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the district court’s narrow view of what it means to participate in a venture.
The district court had required the plaintiffs to show Rubicon took action to operate or manage the venture. The en banc court held that definition was too demanding. Because the statute does not define “participate,” the court applied the ordinary meaning: to take part.
That distinction is important. A company can take part in a venture without owning the factory, employing the workers, or managing day-to-day operations. The plaintiffs pointed to evidence Rubicon coordinated sales and marketing, visited and conducted pre-audits of factories, arranged import and shipping, and claimed in marketing materials to control every aspect of production. Viewing the facts in the plaintiffs’ favor, the court held a reasonable jury could find Rubicon participated in a human trafficking venture.
For employers and businesses, the decision is a reminder that supply chain relationships, marketing representations, audits, import logistics, and sales efforts may all become relevant in civil trafficking litigation. A company’s public statements about control over production can later be used to support an argument that the company took part in the venture.
Knowledge Was Also for a Jury
The Ninth Circuit also held a reasonable jury could find Rubicon knew or should have known about the alleged trafficking.
The court pointed to evidence Rubicon knew by February 2012 about Ratha’s whistleblower report describing forced labor and deplorable working conditions. It also noted Walmart had rejected a shipment in October 2011 because of concerns about factory working conditions. After the whistleblower report, Rubicon allegedly resumed efforts to sell shrimp from Phatthana.
The court held the district court erred by failing to view that evidence in the plaintiffs’ favor. Because a reasonable jury could find Rubicon knew or should have known about the alleged trafficking, the knowledge element could not be resolved against the plaintiffs at this stage.
The Rule 60(b) Issue
The case reached the en banc court through a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, which allows relief from a final judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief.” That remedy is reserved for extraordinary circumstances.
The Ninth Circuit considered the factors used in its prior Rule 60(b)(6) cases involving post-judgment changes in law. The district court had found the plaintiffs acted diligently and moved without undue delay, but denied relief because it viewed the amendment as nonretroactive and believed other grounds independently supported summary judgment.
The en banc court disagreed. It held all three grounds for denying relief were infected by legal error: the attempt-liability ground was undermined by the retroactive amendment, the participation analysis used the wrong legal standard, and the knowledge analysis failed to draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs.
The court therefore reversed the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief and remanded for further proceedings.
The Dissent’s Warning
Judge Callahan dissented, joined in whole or in part by several judges. The dissent agreed with the majority that Landgraf governed and that prior Ninth Circuit cases treating clarifying amendments differently should be overruled. The dissent also agreed the amendment would have retroactive effect, meaning the presumption against retroactivity applied.
But the dissent would not have found clear congressional intent to apply the amendment retroactively. In the dissent’s view, Congress’s use of the word “clarifying,” the timing of the amendment, and the asserted circuit split were not enough. The dissent also argued the majority went too far by reviewing the underlying summary judgment grounds in an appeal from denial of Rule 60(b) relief.
The split shows how consequential the case is. The majority saw Congress as correcting a mistaken interpretation of an existing civil remedy. The dissent saw Congress as creating a new category of liability without saying it should apply to past conduct.
Why the Decision Is Important
Ratha is a major Ninth Circuit decision for civil human trafficking litigation, supply chain liability, and federal retroactivity doctrine.
For plaintiffs, the decision strengthens the civil remedy under section 1595(a), especially where the defendant allegedly tried to profit from trafficking-related labor but did not complete the transaction. For businesses, the decision underscores the litigation risk created by supplier relationships, audits, import arrangements, and public claims of production control when credible reports of forced labor arise.
The decision does not decide whether Rubicon is liable. It sends the case back for further proceedings. But it holds the plaintiffs are entitled to pursue their claims under the clarified statute, and it rejects a narrow view of participation and knowledge at the summary judgment stage.
Ratha v. Rubicon Resources, LLC was filed on February 20, 2026, by the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Case No. 23-55299. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying Rule 60(b) relief from summary judgment in favor of Rubicon Resources, LLC, and remanded for further proceedings.