California’s suitable seating rule after Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy

California employers must provide a seat at any work station where the tasks performed there reasonably permit sitting, even if the employee stands for most of the shift. That is the rule the California Supreme Court announced in Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 1, and it rejected the two arguments employers had relied on for decades: that a job is either a sitting job or a standing job as a whole, and that an employer’s preference for standing settles the question. Ten years later, the decision still controls how the Labor Commissioner and the courts evaluate seating claims, and seating remains a potential risk in individual and Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) lawsuits against restaurants and retailers.

If you operate a restaurant or a retail store, the practical question is no longer whether cashiers or counter staff should sit. It is whether you have looked at each station, decided whether a seat is feasible there, and written down why. This article explains what the wage orders require, what Kilby decided, how later cases have refined the rule, and what an employer should do now.

What the wage orders require

The seating rule is not in the Labor Code. It is found in section 14 of the IWC wage orders, which have the force of statute. (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1027.) Section 14 has two parts. Subdivision (A) states: “All working employees shall be provided with suitable seats when the nature of the work reasonably permits the use of seats.” Subdivision (B) adds that when the nature of the work requires standing, the employer must place an adequate number of suitable seats in reasonable proximity to the work area and let employees use them when they are not engaged in active duties, so long as sitting does not interfere with their duties. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070, subd. 14 (Wage Order No. 7-2001).)

The same language appears in nearly every wage order. Restaurants and other food service operations fall under Wage Order No. 5-2001, which covers the public housekeeping industry, and its section 14 is identical to the mercantile order at issue in Kilby. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050, subd. 14.) Retail stores fall under Wage Order No. 7-2001. Office and clerical work falls under Wage Order No. 4-2001. Only Wage Order No. 17 omits a seating provision, and Wage Orders No. 14 and No. 16 have industry-specific versions.

Section 14 has no penalty provision of its own. Employees enforce it through Labor Code section 1198, which makes it unlawful to employ anyone under conditions a wage order prohibits, and through PAGA, which lets an aggrieved employee recover civil penalties for the violation on behalf of the state. That combination is why many seating cases arrive as PAGA representative actions rather than individual claims. Though, as discussed further below, suitable seating claims can be included in individual lawsuits and claims as well, such as as a legal standard in disability-related cases.

What Kilby decided

Kilby reached the California Supreme Court on certified questions from the Ninth Circuit in two consolidated federal class actions. Nykeya Kilby worked as a customer service representative at CVS, where her duties included running a cash register, stocking and straightening shelves, cleaning, vacuuming, gathering baskets, and removing trash. CVS told her during her interview and training that it expected her to stand. Kemah Henderson and three other bank tellers sued JPMorgan Chase over the same issue at teller stations. In the CVS case, the district court held sections 14(A) and 14(B) were mutually exclusive, looked at the clerk-cashier job as a whole, found that many of its duties required standing, and granted summary judgment. (Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.)

The Supreme Court rejected that whole-job approach. The “nature of the work” under section 14(A) means the tasks an employee actually performs, or is reasonably expected to perform, at a given location, grouped by that location. If the tasks performed at a cash register or a counter reasonably permit sitting, and a seat there would not interfere with other tasks that require standing, the employer must provide a seat for that station. The employee’s other duties elsewhere in the store do not cancel the obligation. (Id. at pp. 8, 18-19.) The court was equally clear that an employee cannot claim a seat for a single task performed briefly or infrequently. Frequency and duration are part of the analysis, and the court rejected any mechanical count of sitting tasks against standing tasks. (Id. at pp. 17-20.)

The court also answered two further questions. Whether work “reasonably permits” a seat is an objective question decided on the totality of the circumstances, and the inquiry looks at the work, not the physical characteristics of the particular employee. (Id. at pp. 8, 19-20, 23.) And when an employer argues that no suitable seat exists for the work, the employer bears the burden of proving it. The employee need not identify a seat that would do the job. (Id. at pp. 24-25.)

One more point from the opinion is easy to miss. Sections 14(A) and 14(B) can both apply to the same employee during one shift. An employee who is entitled to a seat at the register under subdivision (A) may also be entitled, under subdivision (B), to a seat nearby for use during lulls when other duties take the employee to a station that requires standing. (Id. at p. 19.)

Business judgment and the physical layout

An employer’s preference that employees stand is not a defense. CVS and Chase argued that their judgment that customers receive better service from a standing employee deserved deference. The court agreed that an employer defines the job, and that providing a certain level of customer service is an objective duty the employer may reasonably expect and that a court must weigh. But the court drew a line between a legitimate customer service duty and a bare preference for standing. The standard is objective, and an employer cannot defeat the seating rule by labeling a task a standing task. The employer’s view that a duty is best performed standing is evidence to be considered, not a conclusion. (Kilby, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 21-22.)

The physical layout of the workspace is relevant for the same reason. A counter built at a particular height, or a register placed where a stool would block movement, informs what the employer and employee both expect the job to involve. At the same time, an employer may not design a workspace to further a preference for standing or to deny a seat the tasks would otherwise permit. Evidence that comparable employers use seats for similar tasks in similar workspaces is admissible, as is evidence that the layout could reasonably be changed. (Id. at pp. 22-23.)

The court declined to make the employee’s physical characteristics part of the analysis. Section 14(A) asks whether the nature of the work permits a seat, not whether the nature of the worker does. (Id. at p. 23.) An individual employee’s need for a seat because of a medical condition is a separate question under the Fair Employment and Housing Act’s (FEHA) reasonable accommodation provisions, and Kilby does not address it. The two questions still intersect. Seating requests often arrive as part of a broader accommodation request during the interactive process, and that process is beyond the scope of this article. But before an employer concludes a seat would be an undue hardship, it should ask whether section 14(A) already requires one at that station for every employee, disabled or not. If the nature of the work reasonably permits a seat, providing one is not a hardship, and denying the request invites a paired claim. Seating counts often appear alongside FEHA claims for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, and retaliation, with the wage order setting the standard for what the employer should have provided in the first place.

How the Court of Appeal has applied Kilby

Two published decisions show how the rule works in practice, with opposite results.

In LaFace v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 388, a grocery cashier brought a PAGA action claiming Ralphs owed its cashiers a seat at the checkstand and, failing that, a seat nearby for lulls between customers. After a 12-day bench trial with ergonomics experts on both sides, the trial court found that Ralphs cashiers were in continuous motion at the checkstand, that the work did not reasonably permit sitting, and that Ralphs had met its burden of showing no suitable seat existed for its checkstands. On the lull argument, the court found there were no lulls, because Ralphs expected cashiers to clean, restock, and draw customers to open lanes whenever no one was in line. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that sitting at or near the checkstand instead of performing those tasks would have interfered with the cashiers’ active duties. The court also held that a PAGA plaintiff has no right to a jury trial, which is why the case was tried to the bench (judge).

LaFace is the employer’s roadmap. Ralphs won because it put on evidence of what cashiers actually do, minute by minute, and because its expectation that cashiers stay busy between customers was an established job duty, proven through testimony from witnesses on both sides. Kilby allows an employer to define the job that way; LaFace shows what it takes to prove it.

Meda v. AutoZone, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 366 went the other way, on a different question. AutoZone did not dispute that its sales associates could perform some of their counter and register work seated. It argued instead that it had satisfied section 14(A) by keeping two raised chairs in the store, which employees were free to use. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment. The Court of Appeal reversed. The chairs sat outside the manager’s office, not at the front counter. No manager had told Meda she could use one at the register, no written policy said so, and she had never seen a coworker do it. Borrowing from the meal period cases, the court held that “provide” means more than “make available” somewhere on the premises. Where the employer has neither placed a seat at the workstation nor told employees they may use one there, whether the employer provided suitable seating is a fact question that cannot be resolved on summary judgment.

Meda is the piece employers most often get wrong. Merely owning a stool is not compliance. If the work at a station reasonably permits sitting, the seat has to be at the station, or employees have to be told in a way they will understand that they may bring one and use it while working. A chair in the office that no one has been invited to use does not count.

What a seating claim costs

Because section 14 has no penalty of its own, a seating violation is penalized under PAGA’s default provision: $100 per aggrieved employee per pay period, for every pay period in the one-year PAGA limitations period, across every employee who worked a station where a seat should have been provided. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (f)(2).) A single restaurant with 40 front-counter employees paid biweekly can generate six-figure exposure from one count, before attorney fees. Employers with several locations multiply that by the number of locations.

The 2024 PAGA amendments changed the potential exposure for employers who act before a notice arrives. If the employer took all reasonable steps to comply before receiving a PAGA notice or a records request, penalties are capped at 15 percent of the statutory amount. If the employer takes those steps within 60 days after the notice, the cap is 30 percent. Reasonable steps include periodic audits with follow-up action, lawful written policies, and supervisor training on wage order compliance. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subds. (g), (h).) A documented station-by-station seating assessment, a written seating policy, and training for managers on it are the kind of evidence those provisions reward. Employers with fewer than 100 employees also have a pre-litigation cure process through the Labor and Workforce Development Agency under Labor Code section 2699.3.

Seating claims are rarely filed alone. They appear as one count in a PAGA notice alongside meal period, rest break, and wage statement claims, where they add leverage to a settlement demand at little cost to the plaintiff. A defensible seating position removes one line item and signals to opposing counsel that the employer has audited its practices.

What restaurant and retail employers should do now

Start with the stations, not the job titles. Walk each location and list every place an employee works for a sustained stretch: the front counter register, the drive-thru order window, the drive-thru pay and present windows, the host stand, the bakery or coffee bar, the prep line, the dish pit, the office. For each station, write down what employees actually do there, how long a typical stretch at that station lasts, and which of those tasks require standing or moving. Kilby asks what the work at that location permits, so the inventory has to be built the same way.

For each station, decide whether the tasks there reasonably permit a seat and whether a seat would interfere with the standing tasks. Some stations are easy. A drive-thru order-taker on a headset at a fixed screen, or a cashier at a register with no bagging or restocking duties, usually can sit on a properly sized stool for the stretch at that station. Others are easy for opposite reasons. A front-counter team member who takes orders, assembles trays, runs food, and restocks the counter in continuous rotation is doing the kind of work LaFace found did not permit sitting. The hard cases are in between, and for those the question is whether a stool at the station would interfere with the standing tasks or with the level of service the employer expects, measured by what employees do at that station.

If you conclude the nature of the work at a station reasonably permits the use of a seat, put a suitable seat at that station and tell employees in writing they may use it while working there. Meda makes both steps necessary. A stool in the back office with no instruction does not satisfy section 14(A). Suitable means suited to the work: a stool or sit-stand seat at the right height for the counter or screen, stable, and placed where it does not create a tripping or burn hazard.

If you conclude the nature of the work at a station does not reasonably permit the use of a seat, document why. Record the tasks, the frequency and duration of each, the standing tasks a seat would interfere with, and any layout or safety constraints. Then address section 14(B): place an adequate number of seats near the work area for use during lulls, and tell employees they may use them when not engaged in active duties. If your business expects employees to stay busy between customers, as Ralphs did, say so in the job description and training materials so the expectation is an established duty before any dispute arises.

Put the result in a short written seating policy that identifies which stations have seats, confirms employees may use them while working, and states where the lull seats are. Train managers on the policy, and make sure no manager tells an employee to stand at a station where a seat has been provided. Revisit the assessment when a station is remodeled, a new piece of equipment changes the workflow, or a new location opens. An employee who asks for a seat because of a medical condition raises a separate FEHA accommodation question, but the station assessment is the starting point for answering it. A seat section 14(A) already requires cannot be an undue hardship.

Finally, do not wait for an employee to ask. Nothing in section 14 requires a request, and the first time most employers hear about seating is in a claim. The assessment and the policy are the reasonable steps that cap exposure if a notice arrives, and they cost far less than defending a representative action about a stool.


Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. was decided by the California Supreme Court on April 4, 2016, Case No. S215614, reported at 63 Cal.4th 1. Answering questions certified by the Ninth Circuit in two consolidated class actions against CVS and JPMorgan Chase, the Court held that the “nature of the work” under section 14(A) of the IWC wage orders refers to the tasks an employee performs at a given location, not the job as a whole, so an employee who spends part of a shift at a cash register or teller window may be entitled to a seat there even if other duties require standing. Whether the work “reasonably permits” a seat is decided objectively on the totality of the circumstances; an employer’s business judgment and the physical layout of the workspace are relevant but not controlling, and the inquiry does not turn on the physical characteristics of the individual employee. When an employer contends no suitable seat exists, the employer bears the burden of proving it.

Share