California Court Clarifies FEHA Protection for Unpaid Interns and Students in Clinical Programs

California employers and educational institutions sometimes treat “student,” “intern,” “trainee,” and “employee” as separate legal boxes. A recent published California Court of Appeal decision is a reminder that those categories can overlap, especially when a student is performing unpaid clinical work under the supervision and control of an institution.

In Walton v. Victor Valley Community College District, the Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for a community college district in a sexual harassment case brought by a former nursing student. The decision is important for employers, schools, internship programs, training programs, hospitals, and other organizations that use unpaid interns, externs, clinical students, or trainees. The court held a postsecondary nursing student completing required clinical rotations may qualify as an “unpaid intern” protected by California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, even though the clinical work was part of her educational program.

A Nursing Student Alleges Sexual Harassment During Clinical Rotations

Jessie Walton enrolled in Victor Valley Community College District’s nursing program in 2017. As part of the program, she was required to complete clinical rotations at two local hospitals. Those rotations were supervised by District faculty.

According to Walton, her supervisor during the spring 2018 rotations was Diego Garcia, the District’s nursing program director. Walton alleged Garcia engaged in extensive verbal and physical sexual harassment during the rotations and attempted to pressure her into a sexual relationship in exchange for better grades. When she rejected his advances, she claimed he retaliated by giving her a non-passing grade and refusing to meet with her about it.

Walton sent the District a letter in June 2018 describing the alleged harassment and discrimination. The District placed Garcia on administrative leave and hired a third-party investigator. Walton also requested a grade change, asserting Garcia had not fairly addressed her grading concerns. The District denied the request in August 2018. The following month, Walton withdrew from the program and later earned her nursing degree elsewhere.

The third-party investigator eventually issued a 79-page report finding Garcia had engaged in “highly inappropriate behavior” by sexually harassing Walton and another female student. District human resources recommended Garcia’s removal from his tenured position, and he did not return to teach at the District.

The Lawsuit and the Trial Court’s Summary Judgment Ruling

Walton sued the District and Garcia. Her operative complaint included claims under FEHA for sex discrimination, sexual harassment, failure to prevent harassment and discrimination, retaliation, and injunctive relief. She also brought claims under the Civil Code, Education Code, and negligence theories.

The District moved for summary judgment. Among other arguments, it contended Walton lacked standing under FEHA because she was a student, not an employee or unpaid intern. The District also argued she failed to comply with the Government Claims Act for her non-FEHA claims and could not show the District acted with deliberate indifference under Education Code section 66270.

The trial court granted summary judgment for the District. In doing so, it also excluded a declaration from Walton’s attorney because the declaration omitted language stating it was signed under penalty of perjury and failed to include the place of execution. Walton’s attorney later filed a corrected declaration, but the trial court did not accept the cure.

The Court of Appeal reversed nearly all of the ruling.

Technical Defects in Evidence Should Not Decide a Case When They Can Be Fixed

The Court of Appeal first addressed the excluded attorney declaration. The declaration authenticated much of Walton’s opposition evidence, including the attorney’s December 2018 letter to the District and deposition excerpts offered to show the District had prior notice of Garcia’s alleged harassment of other students.

The trial court excluded the declaration because it was not properly subscribed under Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5. The Court of Appeal held this was an abuse of discretion. The defect was technical and curable. Walton’s counsel was in the courtroom and could have corrected the omission during the hearing. He also filed a corrected declaration the same day.

The appellate court emphasized that summary judgment should not be granted based on a correctable procedural mistake when doing so prevents a decision on the merits. That is a useful reminder for litigants, but it is not an invitation to be careless. The safer practice remains obvious: declarations should be carefully reviewed before filing, especially in summary judgment proceedings.

A Student Can Also Be an Unpaid Intern Under FEHA

The central published holding concerns FEHA coverage.

The District argued Walton was not an unpaid intern because she was a student completing required coursework at hospitals. The Court of Appeal rejected that framing. In the court’s view, “student” and “unpaid intern” are not mutually exclusive.

The court relied on FEHA’s 2015 amendments, which extended protections against harassment and discrimination to unpaid interns. It also noted legislative history recognizing that many internships are part of formal educational or vocational programs, including nursing programs. California regulations likewise define an unpaid intern as an individual, “often a student or trainee,” who works without pay in an unpaid internship or limited-duration program providing unpaid work experience.

That reasoning led to the court’s key conclusion: a postsecondary nursing student performing clinical rotations at a hospital may qualify as an unpaid intern under FEHA. Her status as a student did not remove her from FEHA’s protection.

The District also argued Walton was volunteering at hospitals, not for the District. The Court of Appeal found the evidence suggested District faculty supervised Walton during the rotations and controlled the details of her work. Because the District allegedly ran the internship, the District could be subject to FEHA’s provisions prohibiting harassment and discrimination against unpaid interns.

Employers Should Not Assume “Unpaid” Means “Unprotected”

For employers, the practical lesson is direct. FEHA does not protect only traditional employees. It also reaches applicants, unpaid interns, volunteers in certain contexts, and other covered relationships depending on the statute and facts.

An organization that supervises, controls, evaluates, trains, grades, or directs unpaid workers should assume anti-harassment and anti-discrimination protections may apply. That is especially true when the organization receives the benefit of the person’s work, controls the environment, or has authority over future opportunities, grades, recommendations, certifications, or advancement.

The decision is especially relevant to clinical placements, externships, apprenticeships, job shadowing arrangements that become work-like, nonprofit volunteer programs, public agency training programs, and employer-sponsored internship programs.

The Government Claims Act Letter Was Enough

The Court of Appeal also addressed Walton’s non-FEHA claims against the public entity District. The Government Claims Act generally requires a person seeking money damages from a public entity to present a claim before suing.

Walton’s attorney sent the District a 13-page letter in December 2018 describing Garcia’s alleged misconduct, outlining estimated damages, and advising litigation might follow. The letter was labeled as a confidential settlement communication and did not expressly reference the Government Claims Act.

The Court of Appeal still held the letter substantially complied with the statute. It gave the District enough information to investigate the claim and potentially resolve it. The court emphasized the relevant inquiry is not the claimant’s subjective intent in sending the letter. The question is whether the communication disclosed a claim that, if unresolved, would result in litigation.

This is an important point for public employers. A communication does not need to say “Government Claim” on the first page to create risk. A detailed attorney letter describing alleged misconduct, damages, responsible employees, and potential litigation may satisfy the statutory notice requirement even when styled as a settlement communication.

An Investigation Alone May Not Defeat Deliberate Indifference

The Court of Appeal next considered Walton’s Education Code section 66270 claim. That statute prohibits discrimination based on gender, among other protected characteristics, in programs or activities conducted by postsecondary educational institutions receiving state financial assistance or enrolling students who receive state financial aid.

The trial court found the District was not deliberately indifferent because it conducted an investigation. The Court of Appeal disagreed with that categorical approach.

The appellate court did not hold the District was deliberately indifferent as a matter of law. Instead, it held a jury could potentially find deliberate indifference based on the timing and surrounding circumstances. Walton complained in summer 2018. The District began an investigation. But while the investigation was pending, the District refused to change Walton’s grade and required her to repeat the semester. Walton then withdrew from the program. By the time the investigation validated her complaints, she had already left.

The court reasoned that an investigation, by itself, is not always enough. The question is whether the institution’s response was reasonable under the circumstances, including whether it protected the complainant’s access to educational benefits while the process unfolded.

For employers and educational institutions, this is one of the most practical parts of the decision. Investigating is essential, but investigation is not the whole response. Interim measures, academic or workplace consequences, retaliation concerns, and the complainant’s ability to continue participating in the program may all become part of the liability analysis.

Prior Complaints Can Change the Risk Analysis

The Court of Appeal also noted Walton had offered deposition evidence suggesting the District had received previous reports about Garcia sexually harassing other nursing students. Because the trial court wrongly excluded Walton’s attorney declaration, it failed to consider that evidence.

Prior complaints are often significant in harassment cases. They may affect notice, foreseeability, negligent supervision, punitive exposure, deliberate indifference, and the reasonableness of the employer’s response. For employers, this reinforces the importance of tracking complaints, documenting follow-up, and identifying patterns before they become larger institutional failures.

An employer or school cannot safely treat each complaint as isolated if prior reports suggest a recurring problem involving the same supervisor, instructor, manager, or worksite.

The Negligence Claim Also Survived

The District argued Walton’s negligence claim failed under Thomas v. Regents of University of California, a case involving alleged nonphysical abuse by a soccer coach. The Court of Appeal found Thomas did not bar Walton’s negligence claim because Walton alleged unwanted physical touching.

The distinction was important. The court held Walton could continue pursuing a negligence theory against the District based on alleged failures in hiring, retention, or supervision.

The Bottom Line for Employers and Institutions

Walton is not a final liability determination. The Court of Appeal did not decide Walton proved her claims. It decided the trial court should not have ended the case at summary judgment on the grounds it used.

The decision still carries several practical lessons.

First, unpaid interns and students in work-based programs may be protected by FEHA. Employers and institutions should not assume a person falls outside FEHA because the person is unpaid, enrolled in school, or receiving academic credit.

Second, organizations that supervise clinical rotations, internships, externships, or similar programs should treat those participants as protected from harassment, discrimination, and retaliation.

Third, a prompt investigation is necessary, but it may not be sufficient. The organization must also consider whether interim action is needed to prevent further harm, preserve access to the program or workplace, and avoid retaliation.

Fourth, public entities should treat detailed attorney demand letters seriously, even when the letter does not expressly identify itself as a Government Claims Act claim.

Finally, technical procedural defects may sometimes be corrected, but employers should not rely on an opponent’s filing mistake to carry the day when the defect is curable and the merits remain disputed.


Walton v. Victor Valley Community College District was filed on March 18, 2026, modified and certified for publication on April 14, 2026, by the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, Case No. G064668. The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with instructions to deny summary adjudication on Walton’s remaining FEHA, Education Code section 66270, and negligence claims, while granting summary adjudication only on the Civil Code claim Walton did not challenge on appeal.

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