Ninth Circuit Leaves in Place Employer Win in COVID Testing Religious Accommodation Case
Employers have spent the last several years navigating a difficult question: when does an employee’s objection to a workplace health or safety rule qualify as a protected religious belief, and when is it a personal, medical, political, or philosophical objection framed in religious language?
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center, 156 F.4th 886 (9th Cir. 2025), now followed by the court’s April 15, 2026 order denying rehearing en banc, gives employers an important, but contested, answer. In a divided case that drew two substantial dissents from the denial of rehearing, the Ninth Circuit left in place a ruling dismissing an employee’s religious accommodation lawsuit at the pleading stage. The court concluded the employee did not adequately allege a bona fide religious belief conflicting with her employer’s COVID-19 testing requirement.
The decision is significant for employers in California and other Ninth Circuit states because it addresses the threshold question in a Title VII religious accommodation case: whether the employee has alleged a religious belief, practice, or observance that actually conflicts with a workplace requirement. It also shows how difficult these cases can become when an employee’s stated religious objection overlaps with medical research, personal risk assessment, or concerns about bodily harm.
The Employee’s Job and the Workplace COVID Policy
Sherry Detwiler worked for Mid-Columbia Medical Center as a data-privacy executive. According to the allegations discussed by the court, her job did not require direct patient contact. She could perform at least some of her duties remotely, and the medical center had issued her equipment and remote-access tools.
After Oregon adopted a COVID-19 vaccine mandate for healthcare workers, Detwiler requested a religious exemption. She identified herself as a practicing Christian and stated that, after prayer, she believed she could not accept the COVID shot without violating her conscience and relationship with God. The medical center approved the vaccine exemption, but imposed conditions. Detwiler had to wear personal protective equipment when in the office and submit to weekly antigen testing.
The weekly testing requirement became the center of the case. Detwiler objected to the nasal-swab testing method because, according to her allegations, the swab involved ethylene oxide. She asserted that ethylene oxide was carcinogenic, that nasal testing could aggravate her medical conditions, and that submitting to the test would conflict with her Christian duty to protect her body as the temple of the Holy Spirit. She proposed alternatives, including weekly saliva testing or fully remote work while the vaccine and testing requirements remained in effect. The medical center rejected those alternatives and terminated her employment.
The Lawsuit and the Dismissal
Detwiler sued under Title VII and Oregon law, alleging religious discrimination. The district court dismissed the case on the pleadings. In other words, the case did not reach discovery, summary judgment, or trial. The district court concluded she had not plausibly alleged the first element of a religious accommodation claim: a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with an employment duty.
That procedural posture is important. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, courts usually accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and ask whether those allegations state a legally viable claim. The Ninth Circuit panel nonetheless affirmed dismissal. The panel majority concluded Detwiler’s objection to testing was based on her personal and medical judgment about the alleged danger of ethylene oxide, rather than a protected religious belief.
The panel’s reasoning was not that Christianity, prayer, or the belief that the body is a temple are nonreligious. The point was narrower. The panel majority viewed the actual conflict as being between the testing requirement and Detwiler’s belief that the testing method was harmful. Because that belief depended on her interpretation of medical or scientific information, the panel treated it as secular rather than religious.
The Ninth Circuit Declines to Rehear the Case
Detwiler sought panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. On April 15, 2026, the Ninth Circuit denied both requests. The order states that the full court was advised of the petition, a judge requested a vote, and the matter failed to receive a majority of votes from nonrecused active judges in favor of rehearing en banc.
That left the panel decision in place.
The denial of rehearing did not end the debate within the Ninth Circuit. Two dissents accompanied the order, and both argued the panel majority had taken the wrong approach to religious accommodation claims.
The Dissenting Judges Saw the Case Very Differently
Judge Forrest, joined by Judges R. Nelson, Bress, Bumatay, VanDyke, and Tung, argued the panel majority’s approach required courts to judge religious belief too aggressively. In her view, the panel had effectively required plaintiffs to show a clear connection between their religious convictions and their refusal to comply with public-health measures, without relying on secular knowledge. She warned that standard risked reducing religious freedom to protection only for beliefs judges recognize as acceptable or sufficiently religious.
Judge Tung, joined by Judges R. Nelson, Collins, Lee, Bress, Bumatay, and VanDyke, made a related but distinct point. He argued the panel majority legally erred by recharacterizing Detwiler’s objection as “purely secular” merely because it partly depended on a secular consideration. In his view, a person can rely on medical or factual information to identify a physical risk, while relying on religion to decide what they must do about that risk.
Judge Tung also emphasized a potential circuit split. He noted that other circuits, including the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, had taken a more employee-friendly approach in similar COVID accommodation cases involving “body is a temple” religious objections.
Those dissents are important because they show the issue is far from settled nationally. Employers should be cautious about treating Detwiler as permission to reject religious accommodation requests whenever the employee’s objection includes medical, scientific, or personal-risk language.
What the Decision Means for Employers
For employers, the most useful lesson from Detwiler is not that religious accommodation requests can be dismissed out of hand. They cannot. Title VII still requires employers to reasonably accommodate sincerely held religious beliefs, practices, or observances unless doing so would impose an undue hardship. After the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Groff v. DeJoy, an employer denying a Title VII religious accommodation must show the requested accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business.
Detwiler instead addresses an earlier question: whether the employee has identified a religious belief or practice that conflicts with the job requirement in the first place. The Ninth Circuit panel majority concluded Detwiler had not done so because her objection, as pleaded, rested on her medical or scientific judgment about the alleged danger of the testing method.
That distinction can help employers evaluate accommodation requests more carefully. A request should not be rejected merely because it is unusual, individualized, or unsupported by a formal church doctrine. But employers may assess whether the employee has actually identified a religious conflict, as opposed to a personal preference, generalized health concern, political objection, or disagreement with workplace policy.
The safest practice remains a careful, individualized review. Employers should ask neutral follow-up questions when a request is unclear. They should avoid theological debates. They should document the employee’s stated belief, the workplace requirement at issue, the proposed accommodation, the operational impact, and the reasons for any approval, denial, or alternative accommodation.
Practical Takeaways
Detwiler gives Ninth Circuit employers a potentially useful defense in cases where an employee’s asserted religious objection is difficult to separate from personal medical judgment. But it is not a blank check. The dissents demonstrate that several judges on the Ninth Circuit believe the panel majority went too far. Other federal circuits have taken a broader view of religious accommodation pleading in similar cases. And the Supreme Court’s decision in Groff continues to impose a more demanding undue hardship standard once a protected religious conflict is established.
For employers, the better lesson is procedural and practical: do the work on the front end. Treat religious accommodation requests seriously. Ask focused questions. Consider alternatives. Avoid deciding whether the employee’s religion is correct, orthodox, or sensible. Analyze whether the request identifies a religious conflict with a work rule, whether the belief appears sincerely held, and whether accommodation would impose an undue hardship under the employer’s actual operations.
The employer won in Detwiler because the Ninth Circuit concluded the employee had not adequately pleaded a religious conflict. But the sharp dissents show why these cases remain legally sensitive. Employers should not assume every mixed religious, medical, or personal objection is unprotected. The line between a secular objection dressed in religious language and a religious objection informed by secular facts may be the next major battleground in workplace religious accommodation law.
Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center, No. 23-3710, arose from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The Ninth Circuit denied panel rehearing and rehearing en banc on April 15, 2026. The underlying published panel decision is Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center, 156 F.4th 886 (9th Cir. 2025).